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1 Introduction
In view of considerations of eort provision by workers and of using explicit
incentive contracts such as piece rates to allow individuals to reveal their
productivity through their choice of pay method, it would seem that com-
pensation contracts based on objective measures of performance should be
the overwhelming choice by rms.
However, put simply, this is just not what we observe in the United States.
Although not rare, compensation contracts based on explicit measures of in-
dividual performance are the exceptions more than the rule. Over the last
twenty years, much of the theoretical literature devoted to the analysis of the
employment relationship and to the provision of incentives has tried to ratio-
nalize that simple fact. For example, it has been argued that piece rates are
not very prominent as an eort incentive device for reasons having to do with
the diculty of measuring individual output or the importance of teamwork
where cohesion and cooperation between team members is important.
The main objective of this chapter will be to provide a survey of the
empirical work done on the use of incentive pay in the United States focusing
on two main empirical questions: what are the determinants of their use and
what are the eects of pay-for-performance schemes, if any. To avoid simply
enumerating the empirical results found in the literature without having any
sense of the factors rationalizing these results, I will also discuss some of the
economic models relevant to incentive provision so as to highlight the main
issues. However, readers interested in more complete theoretical surveys are
referred to, e.g., Gibbons and Waldman (1999) or Prendergast (1999).
Due to space limitations, I will not discuss the large literature devoted
to executive compensation, for which readers are referred to the survey by
Murphy (1999). I will also not review the growing experimental economics
evidence on the use and eects of incentive schemes. This latter literature
(e.g. Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1995)) has produced some interesting
contributions on the extent to which cooperative behavior among a group of
individuals can occur. Whether those controlled experiments are adequate
substitutes for what happens within real employment relationships may
perhaps be debatable. However, some of the very subtle issues involved in
the provision of incentives are very dicult to take to real data and thus
having the ability to run a controlled experiment in a laboratory setting may
prove useful.
1
2 Incidence of Pay-for-Performance Compen-
sation Schemes.
Although a truly voluminous literature aimed essentially at incorporating
more realism into the theoretical analysis of employment relationships has
emerged over the last twenty ve years, relatively little empirical work has
been done on the topic, especially as it pertains to rank and le workers
(as opposed to executives) who are the main focus of this survey. While
much eort has been devoted to characterizing optimal explicit incentive
contracts, it seems to this author that it took some time before people really
started wondering why the use explicit incentive schemes was not widespread.
Consequently, before analyzing the determinants and the eect of pay-for-
performance contracts, it would seem appropriate to show the incidence of
various forms of compensation.
Using four dierent data sets, Table 1 documents the extent to which
workers in more or less representative samples of the population operate
under some form of incentive pay scheme.
1
The least one can say about
the use of explicit incentive pay schemes is that it is rather low, as less
than 10% of the workers are paid either through commissions or piece rates.
In fact, only in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) is the
percentage close to 10%; in the Quality of Employment Survey (QES), The
January 1977 Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), the fraction of workers paid either a commission
or a piece rate hovers around 4%. A likely reason for such a discrepancy
is that the question on how workers are paid diers across surveys. In the
NLSY workers are simply asked if part of their earnings is based on either
piece rates or commissions. In the other three data sets the question tends to
be more restrictive: workers are asked if they are a paid either an hourly rate,
a salary, or something else. The mutually exclusive nature of the question is
such that workers paid, for example, by the hour and who also earn a certain
relatively low percentage through piece rates are likely to report themselves
as being paid on an hourly basis. The reverse is true for those who earn most
of their labor income through piece rates or commissions. Still, even with
the more liberal NLSY denition, it can safely be said that explicit pay-
for-performance contracts are not ubiquitous. Yet, the fraction of workers
being paid either through an explicit contract or receiving a bonus based
1
See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the data sets used.
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on individual job performance is over 20% in the NLSY, and that excludes
workers on prot sharing plans. If we include workers on prot sharing plans,
the percentage is in fact close to 50%! Consequently one can see that rms
use many tools other than incentive pay based on an objective measure of
individual performance.
2
Table 2 shows the breakdown by occupation. Not surprisingly, most com-
mission workers tend to be in sales related work while most piece rate workers
tend to be operatives, although quite a few service workers report being paid
according to an explicit measure of performance. In contrast, promotions,
bonuses, and prot sharing plans seem to be far more evenly distributed
across occupations. From looking at Table 2, we can immediately see that
the occupations for which output appears to be easily measured are the ones
where explicit incentives are most used. Consequently, we would expect mea-
surability issues to be part of any model that tries to predict the use of such
pay systems. In a related vein, another interesting feature of Tables 1 and 2
is that it would appear that rms clearly favor providing incentives through
promotions instead of using incentive schemes directly tied to a measure of
performance such as piece rates or commissions. Although this is simply a
re-statement of Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988)'s observation, we should
nevertheless be a bit more cautious in that bonuses, which are directly based
on a measure of performance, are used about as frequently as promotions.
3
2
This is of course assuming rms use prot sharing or bonuses as incentive devices.
3
Two caveats here: although the question on bonuses in the NLSY makes explicit
reference to job performance, respondents are not asked to make any dierence between
their individual performance and team performance. Secondly, promoted workers may
also report that they were paid bonuses. On that last point, about a third of the workers
reporting being paid a bonus also reported having received a promotion since the previous
interview.
3
Part I
Incentive Contracts Based on
Individual Performance
Outline
In this section I will focus on compensation forms based on an explicit indi-
vidual measure of performance, such as piece rates or commissions. As we
saw in the previous section, their use is not widespread, especially in the
case of piece rates. Thus it is important to understand why that might be.
Although an obvious answer would be that individual output might simply
be too costly to measure, this still leaves unanswered the question of why
we observe both straight time rates or salaries and piece rates in a given
well-dened industry/occupation cell. After all, if output if easy to measure
for rm A and rm A pays a piece rate, why does rm B in the same sector
use a salary instead?
After outlining the main models of choice of pay methods, I will then
survey what we know so far about the determinants of dierent contract
forms. Then I will look at the eect explicit incentive contracts on wages (and
thus, indirectly, on productivity). A major issue is the identication of a true
causal eect on productivity of going from an input-based compensation
scheme, such as an hourly rate, to an output-based one.
3 Determinants of Incentive Pay
3.1 Theoretical Considerations
3.1.1 The Lazear-Brown Model
Before trying to determine whether and to what extent incentive pay con-
tracts do indeed work, it might rst be useful to understand part of the
process by which some workers in a given industry/occupation cell are paid,
say, by a piece rate while others in the same cell are paid an hourly rate.
4
4
I use the term piece rate here so as to encompass both true piece rate contracts as
well as commission contracts. As emphasized by Lazear (1986), any form of pay method
4
Economic theory oers a straightforward prediction when rms can ob-
serve the eort put forth by their workers: it simply does not matter whether
workers are paid a piece rate or a salary. Firms can enforce the rst-best level
of eort under either type of compensation form. To see this, consider the
following simple model. A rm hires a single worker and eort e is directly
related to output y by the following very simple technology:
y(e) = e (1)
On the other hand, the worker's utility is assumed to be separable in wages
W and in the cost of eort C(e):
U(W; e) = W   C(e) (2)
where C(e) represents the worker's cost of eort with C
0
(e) > 0 and C
00
(e) >
0. In other words, eort is increasingly costly to the worker. Workers can
be paid either a piece rate P (y) or an input-based rate S(e). Assuming
a competitive environment that drives prots to zero, workers will be paid
their full marginal productivity. In other words, P (y) = e or, under a salary,
S(e) = e. The socially ecient level of eort e is such that
C
0
(e) = 1 (3)
The fact that eort is observed and thus contractible makes it possible for
rms to oer either a contract in which pay is output-based i.e. it depends
on y, which would be a piece rate contract, or an input-based contract in
which pay is based on e, and the rst-best eort level can be achieved.
5
A more interesting and realistic case is when eort cannot be contracted
upon but output can. So let's assume for the moment that individual pro-
ductivity can be measured, albeit at a cost, and that eort is not an issue
here: rms hire from a pool of workers who are heterogeneous in their (time-
invariant) productivity y. As in Lazear (1986) or Brown (1990), dierent
methods of pay allow workers to sort themselves among rms. Zero expected
prots are assumed throughout and workers are also assumed to know their
productive ability but not the rms unless they incur a monitoring cost M.
that links pay to an objective measure of output is, in fact, a piece rate contract.
5
The socially ecient level of output is such that the total social surplus is maximized.
This is given by the choice of e which maximizes y(e)-c(e). Using the fact that y(e) = e,
we get the rst-order condition shown in equation(3).
5
Thus workers can be in a rm that pays a salary S which is independent of
productivity y or in a piece rate rm that pays W = y M . Thus the worker
chooses the piece rate rm if and only if:
y  M > S (4)
and the others choose to work in the salary rm. Provided that M > 0,
there will be rms oering S > 0. Firms paying salaries will know they have
attracted workers of lower average quality and they will pay a salary equal
to the expected productivity of that subsample of workers:
S = E(yjy < y) (5)
where y = S + M . Therefore, in this simplest of cases, compensation is
independent of productive skills in jobs paying salaries while compensation
moves one-for-one with skills in piece rates. More generally, we may simply
allow skills to be rewarded dierently in the two types of jobs:
6
lnw
m
= a
m
+ b
m
y (6)
with m=s,p and
a
s
> a
p
; b
s
< b
p
;
This optimal sorting of workers is illustrated in Figure 1 in the case where
b
s
= 0. This simple model of self-selection illustrate what most people have
in mind when they say that salaries or hourly rates do not vary with output.
Of course, over a longer term period, promotion opportunities and the simple
continuation of the employment relationship are very likely to depend on y
even in salaried jobs. So the sharp distinction between output-based pay
and input-based pay is likely to be blurred in reality: people have to account
for their actions at one point, irrespective of how they are paid.
Still, this simple model oers sharp predictions concerning the use of
incentive pay:
 More productive workers choose piece rate contracts because only for
them is it worth it to pay the measurement cost (through a reduced
paycheck). Thus, any variable that proxies worker productivity such as
years of schooling should be positively associated with the use of piece
rates.
6
Brown (1990) also suggests that there may exist in-between cases, such as merit pay.
6
 The variance of output will be larger in incentive jobs than in salaried
jobs because of the sensitivity of pay to individual productivity.
 Piece rate contracts will tend not to be oered the more costly it is to
measure output. Consequently, we would expect that any factor rep-
resenting (or proxying) costs of measurement to be negatively related
to incentive pay.
 The more heterogeneous is the work force in terms of productivity, the
more there is to gain from separating the more productive from the
least productive workers.
7
Note that the cost of measuring individual output will depend in particular
on the extent of teamwork. A teamwork environment means that it may be
very dicult to separate each individual's contribution from the total team
contribution. I will return to this point later.
3.1.2 The Principal-Agent Model
The basic Lazear model emphasizes the selection process by which more
productive workers choose to be paid explicit incentives. Also, for output
to be observed and contracted upon, the rm must incur a cost. Otherwise,
only piece rate rms would exist in equilibrium. In addition, risk aversion
is not a central theme of that model. On the other hand, the main point
of the basic principal-agent model is to emphasize how risk aversion on the
part of workers combined with unobservability of eort aects the optimal
sharing of risks and the provision of incentives. The risks are in the form
of environmental factors (machine breakdowns, weather, depressed market
conditions, etc.) over which the worker has no control and which induce
variability in output (and compensation) that the worker would like to avoid.
The rm is assumed to costlessly observe output, but cannot separate the
eects of the risky environment from the level of eort put forth by the
worker. The best assessment it can make is that high eort is more likely to
have been exerted when output is high than when output is low. Even that
may be hard to infer if random factors become too important.
Under these conditions, the optimal contract links pay directly to output,
possibly in a linear fashion in which w = a + by where w is the wage and
7
See Lazear (1986) for a proof.
7
y is the output.
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Since there are environmental risks associated with the
production process, we assume that output y depends linearly on both eort
and a normally distributed noise term ". The slope of that contract (i.e. the
parameter b) is what the rm tries to set optimally. Assuming that the rm
is risk neutral while the worker is risk averse with a coecient of risk aversion
represented by r, the optimal piece rate contract sets the slope at
b

=
1
1 + r
2
C
00
(7)
where 
2
is the variance of the noise term " representing the degree of risk
(or luck) involved, and C
00
is the rate at which the marginal cost of eort
increases.
9
Given an optimal piece b

, a is then chosen to make sure that the
worker earns exactly the same amount as she would earn in her next best
alternative. Thus, a can be seen as the base salary to which is added an
incentive pay component b

y. We can see from equation (7) that the more
risk averse is the worker, the more muted will be the incentive component.
On the other hand, if the worker is risk neutral (r = 0), then b = 1, no
matter what is the magnitude of the variability in output. However, with
risk averse workers, the optimal piece rate is generally lower than 1. From
equation (3) we saw that the rst best level of eort is such that b = 1. Here,
the unobservability of eort combined with risk aversion forces the rm to
optimally settle for a second-best solution in which incentives are muted.
The rm does so by balancing the costs and benets of changing the strength
of the incentive component. If it did set b = 1, the benet would be a higher
level of eort coming at the cost of having to compensate the worker for
the added risk she would bear. In essence, the optimal contract involves
delegation by the rm to the worker of the appropriate choice of actions to
take. The rm knows that its interest conicts with the worker's (for a given
amount paid, he would like to provide as little eort as he can) so it sets
up the optimal contract in such a way as to induce the worker to take the
8
In general, the optimal contract is not linear unless one assumes that the worker's
utility function is exponential (which implies a constant absolute risk aversion). In what
follows I will assume that the conditions required for linearity to be the optimal form are
met. In practice, many commission or piece rate contracts are linear. Another commonly
observed form involves a bonus for surpassing a quantitative target which is added to the
base salary. This sort of piece rate contract is not linear.
9
See Prendergast (1999) for a more general formulation in which both objective and
subjective performance measures are used to determine the optimal incentive contract.
8
appropriate actions.
10
The foregoing clearly suggests that unless we have either extreme risk
aversion or output is virtually random (
2
!1), workers should all be paid
a piece rate. In addition, the so-called Informativeness Principle (Milgrom
and Roberts (1992)) states that any signal observed by the rm that informs
it on the worker's eort (e.g. customer complaints, bad weather, other sales-
persons' output in the same market) should be incorporated into the optimal
contract. In other words, anything that reduces the luck element and helps
the rm extract a better signal of eort should be used so as to increase the
incentive component of the worker's pay. Consequently, workers' pay would
likely change frequently. The simple facts are that 1) relatively few people
are paid piece rates or commissions; and 2) people's pay does not change all
the time.
This forces us to think about what factors may contribute to the overall
very low incidence of explicit pay-for-performance contracts. The rst issue
that comes to mind is about measurement. Although the rm may have a
good idea of what it wants workers to enhance by their choice of actions,
it is not clear that it can actually base the compensation scheme on that
dimension. Sometimes, the rm will instead base the worker's pay on another
measure that appears to be equivalent. However, as pointed out by Baker
(1992), it is not clear that the worker will act in the rm's best interest
by responding to the incentive scheme that he is being oered. An often-
cited example (e.g. in Brown (1990) is that of the incentive contract oered
to former quarterback Ken O'Brien of the New York Jets. After a year in
which he threw a lot interceptions (and also a lot of touchdown passes-i.e.
he took some risks), he was oered a contract in which is nal pay would be
a function of many factors. In particular, his paycheck would be negatively
aected by the number of interceptions he would throw. The end result was
that O'Brien held onto the ball a lot more than in the previous year instead
of throwing it and, in the process, was sacked much more often. While it
is part of this particular sport's gospel that not turning the ball over is a
key to winning games (which is presumably the ultimate goal pursued by
management), putting such an explicit emphasis on that aspect alone likely
turned out to be counterproductive. This is just one example among many
10
In a related vein, see Garen (1998b) on the issue of how control of the work routine will
be assigned when the cost of measuring output varies and how this aects the provision
of incentives.
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illustrating what Kerr (1975) called The Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping
for B. That problem can also be formulated in a dierent way. Suppose
that in a job in which a good measure of output for a particular task does
exist, workers are asked to perform many value-enhancing activities, all of
which compete for the worker's limited time. Depending upon whether these
dierent tasks are substitutes or complements (e.g. maximizing the number
of units produced by a machine in a given time period is likely to be in
conict with the maintenance of the equipment), then it may be optimal
to set the piece rate slope to zero Holmström and Milgrom (1991). The
worker's pay then consists only of a base salary and has no incentive pay
component. Another possibility for the rm is to base part of the worker's
pay on the aspect of the job for which an objective performance measure
exists and then to complete the compensation package by basing the rest on
a subjective measure which, by its very nature, is practically impossible for
a third-party to verify. I will come back on this aspect of incentive provision
below when I discuss implicit incentives.
Finally, some recent literature, most of it theoretical, has pointed out that
how rms carry out their activity or organize production is in fact closely
related to the provision of incentives. In particular, Holmström and Milgrom
(1994) emphasize how rms that cannot easily monitor inputs will tend to
subcontract that activity and provide incentives by paying agents according
to output. Conversely, when the output is a complex object to dene and the
rm both controls the technology and can relatively easily monitor workers'
eort, it should tend to produce in-house and oer relatively low-powered
incentives. This goes back to the notion that delegation of authority must
be accompanied by incentive provisions. More generally, it points to the
importance of designing organizational structures that complement one an-
other instead of viewing each part on a stand-alone basis. Garen (1998a)
further explores the same line of argument by pointing out that salary pay
systems and hourly pay systems emerge as optimal response to dierent work
environments. Following Fama (1991), he argues that when eort is tightly
linked to output, rms will monitor eort and pay by the hour. On the other
hand, when eort is a very poor signal of output (poor in the sense of be-
ing very noisy), salaries will instead be paid. MacLeod and Parent (1999a)
make much the same argument in considering the determinants of piece rates,
hourly rates, salaries, commission, and bonuses.
In summary, renements made to the basic principal-agent model have
made it possible to further our understanding of the factors explaining the
10
low incidence of explicit pay-for-performance contracts. In addition, even in
its basic formulation, that model can rationalize the use of relative perfor-
mance evaluations to provide incentives. By the Informativeness Principle,
the rm should use any information that helps to reduce the noise present in
the output signal. In the limit, if it could get a perfect signal, there would
not be any risk (
2
= 0) and the rm would set b

= 1. One way for the
rm to reduce the importance of the noise is by comparing dierent workers
in the same job, such as sales persons operating in the same market. Given
that they face more or less the same common risks, those can be purged
through relative performance evaluation. Thus, the only thing that matters
in terms of performance is the rank of each worker. The solution for the
rm in such a setting is to let the workers compete for, say, performance
bonuses or promotions, much like in a sports tournament Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Rosen (1986)). However, tournaments may prove to be counterpro-
ductive in situations where teamwork is important or, more generally, where
the rm benets from having people collaborating with one another even in
an informal way. Attributing rewards based solely on the ranking of indi-
viduals may trigger sabotage activity (or, less spectacularly, the absence of
cooperation) Lazear (1989) because the interdependency between the work-
ers' output levels is such that each one benets from decreasing the others'
output. Consequently, any job that involves teamwork should tend not to be
associated with incentives based on individual performance.
3.2 The Role Played by Institutions
Other factors that may or may not be correlated with those in the list above
include the gender mix of the workforce and the presence of a collective
bargaining agreement. Concerning unions, their role in determining con-
tract form is likely to be ambiguous. On the one hand, it is well known in
the wage inequality literature that unions tend to reduce it, at least within
unionized establishment. Indeed, the dramatic decline in the percentage of
workers covered by a CBA over the last thirty years has been shown to be
an important factor behind the substantial increase in earnings inequalities
in the United States (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996)). Assuming that
unions favor wage compression, it may appear that they would tend to favor
hourly rates or salaries over incentive pay. On the other hand, unions may
also play an active role in facilitating the operation of a piece rate system by
getting the rm to commit to a piece rate schedule that would need union
11
approval before being modied. Such an outside constraint on the freedom
of management to adjust rates in the face of a changing environment may
actually be benecial because rms would often be tempted to cut the rates
or adjust the performance threshold upward for a bonus once workers would
have revealed how dicult the job really is. Implicit in this statement is the
fact that rms are assumed to lack some information that the workers possess
about the production process. Workers, knowing that rms can not commit
not to adjust the rates once it has all the relevant information, will reduce
their eort level at the start in order to guarantee themselves higher rates
in the future. This is the so-called ratchet eect problem (Gibbons (1987),
Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992)). Therefore, a contractually agreed upon
piece rate schedule, because it cannot be easily modied at management's
will, could actually provide benets over the long run.
11
As for the eect that gender might have on the observed choice of pay
scheme, much of the argument rests on the potentially weaker degree of labor
force attachment by women (Goldin (1986)). The reason, of course, is that
women are more likely than men to have career interruptions due to child-
bearing decisions. If rms provide incentives to their workers by tilting the
wage prole (Lazear (1981)) so that young workers are paid less than their
full marginal productivity in exchange for wages higher than the value of their
marginal product when they have more seniority (conditional on not having
been caught shirking), then this sort of deferred compensation arrangement
may not suit women who plan to leave their job at one point. And, precisely
because female workers tend not to stay, rms would not expect deferred
compensation to have a strong incentive eect on them. Consequently, as
argued by Goldin (1986), female workers may be more likely than men to
choose piece rates because of the lower value of the deferred portion of the
compensation package. Piece rates, in eect, provide short-term incentives
which may suit women better. Although the same argument could be oered
to suggest that women are more likely than men to prefer commission con-
tracts, Geddes and Heywood (2000) argue instead that commission workers
often interact on a repeated basis with customers, which again makes the
relationship long term in nature. Consequently they argue that men should
be more likely to be paid commissions.
In addition, if women prefer to have more exibility in their work schedule
11
See also Lazear (1986) for a solution to the problem of underprovision of eort by
the worker when the rm cannot commit not to renegotiate the rates.
12
because of family responsibilities in general (illnesses, picking up the children
at daycare, etc.), then they may choose (or rms may choose for them) jobs
for which teamwork is not a crucial factor. If teamwork requires cohesion
among the members of the team, then any disruption of the work routine due
to a worker being absent might be costly to the rm. Since teamwork is likely
to make the cost of measuring individual output higher, it it likely that rms
may favor implicit incentives (possibly deferred compensation packages) over
explicit individual incentive schemes. This, as Geddes and Heywood (2000)
suggest, might be an additional factor why women are more likely than men
to be paid piece rates.
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3.3 The Evidence
In the previous subsection, we saw that whether rms use an explicit incentive
pay scheme or not will depend mainly on:
 whether individual output can be measured.
 the cost of such measurement.
 the monitoring technology.
 the degree of risk aversion on the part of workers.
 the randomness in output.
 the level of worker skills.
 the complexity of the job (e.g. number of tasks).
 whether part or all of the randomness associated with a particular
job can be ltered out by performing relative performance evaluations
of a given group of workers. The rank of the workers in terms of
productivity, as opposed to their absolute productivity, will determine
who gets the largest rewards.
12
Concerning the relationship between risk aversion and the optimal incentive contract,
much of the evidence available so far comes from work done on executive compensation.
Recent contributions on this line of research include Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), who
nd that incentive contracts are sensitive to risk aversion, and Garen (1994) who nds
contrary evidence. As mentioned in the introduction, the emphasis in this survey is clearly
on rank and le workers. For a comprehensive survey on executive compensation see
Murphy (1999).
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 Gender.
Before looking at the eect of some of the factors outlined above in a multi-
variate context, it may be useful to show some descriptive statistics linking
job characteristics to either pay schemes or to occupations. Table 3 shows,
using both the QES and the NLSY, the fraction of workers in each of the
twenty occupations listed who reported that their job was associated with
the characteristics listed. It is interesting to note that the occupations for
which teamwork appears to be less important (sales, operatives) are the ones
in which we nd almost all the piece rate or commission workers in the sam-
ples. Figure 2 shows more directly the degree to which the characteristics are
linked to pay methods. While this evidence is purely descriptive, we can see
that many of the factors predicted by theory not to be associated with piece
rates or commissions seem to go in the right direction. More particularly,
teamwork clearly appears to favor salaries or hourly rates over piece rates or
commissions while multitasking is most prevalent in salaried jobs. Figure 2
also suggests that treating commissions as being similar to piece rates may
not be totally appropriate: commission work seems to be more complex
in the sense that workers report learning more new things and having less
repetitive tasks than is the case for piece work.
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Table 4 summarizes the evidence concerning the impact of some of the
factors in determining contract form. Naturally, some of those variables
are dicult to measure and it has been a challenging exercise to arrive at
convincing evidence, especially taking into account the fact that the vari-
ables researchers are trying to explain are categorical, and, as explained in
Appendix 2, misclassication of pay methods makes it harder to measure
relationships than when the variable to be explained is continuous.
Still, both Brown (1990) and MacLeod and Parent (1999a) nd fairly
strong evidence that multitasking tends not to be associated with piece rates
or commissions. In addition MacLeod and Parent nd that worker auton-
omy, does tend to go hand in hand with such explicit incentive contracts.
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A similar result is found by Garen (1998a) in the context of studying the
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In fact, in MacLeod and Parent (1999a) we put piece rate and hourly rated workers
in one group and commission and salaried workers in another.
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In MacLeod and Parent (1999a) we put piece rate and hourly rated workers in one
group and commission and salaried workers in another. So, even though gure 2 would
suggest that, contrary to the theory, multitasking is prevalent in commission work, relative
to piece rate or hourly rated jobs, such is not the case when we compare commissions with
salaries.
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determinants of salaries vs. hourly rates. The result on autonomy is very
much consistent with the story in Holmström and Milgrom (1994), who em-
phasize that delegation of authority is likely to come with output-based in-
centives. Among other results reported in both MacLeod-Parent and espe-
cially in Brown, teamwork appears to favor the use of hourly rates or salaries
instead of output-based incentive contracts. This is as expected since team-
work means that individual output may in fact be dicult to measure and/or
cooperative behavior among workers is likely to be easier to achieve when in-
centives are not individual-based.
As for the other factors aecting the probability of observing explicit
pay-for-performance contracts, Geddes and Heywood (2000) nd that, as
hypothesized, women are at the same time more likely to be paid piece rates
and less likely to be paid commissions than men. This is consistent with
the view that those two types of explicit contracts are in fact dierent even
though in both cases pay depends directly on measured output. The argu-
ment raised by Geddes and Heywood that commission work may be better
characterized as having more of a long term perspective than a piece rate job
is actually complementary to a certain extent to the point made in MacLeod
and Parent (1999a) that output under a commission contract is very likely
to be much more noisy than in piece work. Hence, it may take some time
before an individual doing commission work develops the skills and contacts
necessary to reduce the idiosyncratic variability in output.
4 Incentive Eect of Pay-for-Performance Con-
tracts
In the previous section we saw that rms who oer output-based compen-
sation schemes can expect to attract and retain more productive workers.
Naturally, rms would also like to induce workers of a given ability level to
work harder by tying part of their paycheck to an explicit measure of output.
Although this may seem obvious, it is not: even if a worker is paid a straight
salary that does not vary with the (unobservable to the rm) eort exerted
by the worker, the rm can still provide some incentives to its workers by,
for example, basing the continuation of the employment relationship upon
past performance: a worker cannot expect to keep his job forever if he shirks
continually. I will come back later on the issue of providing incentives in the
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course of a long term relationship.
That being said, it is in principle possible to assess whether commission
or piece rate contracts have any incentive eect provided that we con-
trol properly for the selection process governing the choice by individuals of
those types of compensation methods. In other words, the issue boils down
to whether one can purge any estimated productivity or wage eect of its
unobserved ability component. As such, the main problem facing researchers
has to do with the existence of the appropriate data and the use of the appro-
priate statistical tools. In essence, as in all evaluation problems, researchers
try to answer the so-called what if question: what would have happened
to the same workers paid piece rates or commissions had they been working
under a time rate or a salary?
4.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence
Somewhat arbitrarily, I will focus on four specic studies carried out over
the last 20 years or so. I choose as a starting point John Pencavel's (1977)
work since it signalled a renewed interest in the topic among economists.
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To be sure, many studies had been carried out over the years by researchers,
particularly in industrial relations.
The main characteristic shared by these four studies is that they are
all cross-sectional. In other words, none of these papers follow a sample of
workers or rms through time. Consequently, they all implicitly assume that
the what if question can be answered satisfactorily by simply comparing
the average pay or productivity of incentive workers to that of the time rated
workers, conditioning out the eect of the observable characteristics present
in the samples. In other words, the control group made of workers not paid
under an explicit pay-for-performance contract is a good approximation of the
counterfactual state for workers who are operating under pay-for-performance
contracts. This is a strong assumption, especially considering the theoretical
model outlined above which stresses that, in fact, the two types of workers are
likely to be dierent. Of course, if all the characteristics present in the data
control perfectly for the dierence in individual productivity, using cross-
sectional data poses no particular problem. However, this strong requirement
15
Indeed, Pencavel starts his paper by citing Alfred Marshall's Principles to illustrate
that economists used to be interested in the notions of intensity and diligence of worker
eort manifested by workers before essentially leaving this eld to industrial relations
researchers.
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is very unlikely to be met.
The other three studies are by Seiler (1984), Brown (1992), and Ewing
(1996). Seiler and Brown used very large samples of establishments from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Industry Wage Surveys, each survey covering a
particular industry, while Seiler uses just one wave of the NLSY.
All four papers nd a positive relationship between the use of incentive
contracts and wages, consistent with many of the previous studies that had
been carried out before the Pencavel paper.
16
Note that all of the above-
mentioned authors were aware that some selection process was involved, ei-
ther on the rm side or on the worker side, the title to Pencavel's paper
making explicit reference to the screening of workers by rms and Ewing
being careful not to mention that the estimated relationship represents any
incentive eect: in fact, he simply highlights that his results are consistent
with the model exposited in Brown (1992), which itself is a straightforward
extension of the Lazear (1986) model.
The safest conclusion that can be reached looking at these studies is that,
indeed, higher productivity does seem to go hand-in-hand with explicit pay-
for-performance contracts, but that we really do not know whether the eect
is causal or simply reects the selection of intrinsically more productive work-
ers into jobs that pay according to some form of explicit incentive contact.
Note that from the rm's perspective, even if incentive pay does not induce
workers to supply a higher level of eort, the screening mechanism embodied
in incentive contract is such that it will hire more productive workers anyway.
Consequently, one would expect rms to use incentive pay whenever a good
objective measure of output exists, such as in sales. However, even when
what appears to be a very good objective measure of productivity exists,
there are situations when rms are very reluctant to put a lot of incentive
pressure on just one dimension of the job. I will return to this issue later
when implicit incentives are examined.
4.2 Longitudinal Evidence
Given that we can expect workers to be positively selected into piece rate
or commission jobs, it is very important that we can somehow nd a way to
answer the usual what if question: what would have happened to workers
paid piece rates had they been paid a salary or an hourly rate? Answer-
16
See either Pencavel (1977) or Seiler (1984) for the specic references.
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ing that question requires the use of longitudinal data where workers are
observed in both circumstances.
17
By using the so-called within worker
variation in pay methods we can then recover the incentive eect. While this
is no doubt a major improvement over cross-sectional data, it is not bullet
proof. First of all, it assumes that whatever unobserved worker characteris-
tic (or unobserved productivity) drives the selection into incentive contracts,
that characteristic does not change through time. Consequently, we can ap-
ply standard xed-eect estimators in which a simple transformation of the
data purges all time-invariant worker components. That assumption would
be violated, for example, in the case where both the rm and the worker are
actually unsure about the latter's productivity which would be inferred from
observing the worker's output through time. In that case, the unobserved
(to the econometrician) worker productivity component would not be time
invariant and could not be dierenced out from the wage equation. However,
most applied researchers are willing to consider the xed-eect assumption
as a reasonable approximation to what they realize is a more complex pro-
cess. Secondly, all unobserved dimensions of the wage determination process
are not limited only to the worker: how productive a worker is with a par-
ticular rm depends to a certain degree on how well that worker is matched
with her/his current employer. Consequently, it may not be enough to have
multiple observations of the same worker across jobs; we would need also to
have multiple observations within the same employment relationship. In that
case, the incentive eect is identied through the changes in pay methods
with the same employer. Now, of course, staying with the same employer
does not necessarily mean that one's tasks have stayed the same: a worker's
position within the rm could change, which could possibly lead to a much
dierent job. Still, the ability to control for unobserved employer-employee
17
Strictly speaking, that is not necessary. One could still identify the true causal eect
of piece rate contracts with cross-sectional data provided there existed an exogenous de-
terminant of that form of payment that played no direct role in the log wage equation. It
is very dicult, a priori, to think of such a credible exclusion restriction. Another way
to identify the incentive would be to impose distributional assumptions (usually normal-
ity) and calculate the conditional expectation of the selected residuals in order to include
it in the wage regression. This is, of course, the now familiar two-step Heckman se-
lection procedure. In principle, the incentive eect could be identied even without the
aid of credible exlusion restrictions (or instruments). However, the identication would
be achieved solely because of the specic functional and distributional form assumptions
imposed. Most researchers are very wary of using a Heckman-type procedure without an
exclusion restriction.
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matching eect is likely to represent a major improvement over simply being
able to control for unobserved worker attributes.
Three recent studies have used multiple observations of the same work-
ers with given employers to try to identify the incentive eect of incentive
contracts. Parent (1999) exploited the fact that questions on pay methods
were asked three straight years in the National Longitudinal of Youth which,
combined with ability to identify each jobs separately, allowed the use of
xed-eect methods to purge the estimates of some the biases caused by
omitted variables, including unobserved job-match characteristics. On the
other hand, Lazear (1996) used instead repeated observations of workers in a
single rm which changed the way it paid its workers, going from hourly rates
to piece rates. The Lazear sample oers a cleaner way to identify the true
causal eect in that the only thing that changed in that company was the
pay scheme: the job (windshield installation) did not change before and after
the switch. He is also able to analyze other results of the pay change, such
as the extent to which the company (Safelite Glass Inc.) retained its best
employees while the least productive ones left after nding out that working
under a piece rate was not to their advantage compared to the being paid an
hourly rate.
Interestingly, while the data set used greatly dier, it turns out that
the estimated average wage eects are fairly similar (a little over 6% for
Parent and at least 9% for Lazear) and that the portion of the cross-sectional
wage dierences between incentive workers and other workers that can be
attributed to worker selectivity eects is also similar. In addition, Lazear
shows that absenteeism decreased following the change, thus giving an added
source of productivity growth. Although piece rates do seem to induce greater
worker eort (although there are still some unresolved issues, see below),
Parent nds that workers earnings bonuses do not appear to be earning any
wage premium once selection eects are taken into account.
In addition to trying to estimate the incentive eect, Parent (1999) also
estimates a simple model of the covariance structure of wages in order to
identify the main sources of the larger observed residual variance of wages
for incentive workers.
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Seiler (1984) had previously observed the same phe-
nomenon in his sample of Industry Wage Survey workers. He conjectured
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Residual in the sense of netting out the eect of schooling and labor market experience.
In fact, it makes little dierence whether one looks at the raw wages or the wages net of
experience and schooling; in both cases, the variance is larger in the subsample of workers
paid either a piece rate or a commission.
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that this reected the greater risk (of output variability) faced by incen-
tive workers. Consequently, assuming risk aversion on the part of workers,
those that were paid piece rates required a compensating dierential for the
higher earnings risk they faced. This would partly explain the wage premium
enjoyed by incentive workers, the rest of it being due to eort inducing ef-
fects. By decomposing the residual variance into a worker-specic component
reecting the underlying heterogeneity of worker productivity and a true
residual term, Parent (1999) showed that the variance in wages for incentive
workers was accounted for by the worker component to a much greater ex-
tent than was the case for other workers. That result is not consistent with
incentive workers being compensated for higher risks. In fact, it turns out
that the variance net of the worker component, which would better reect
income risk, is actually larger for the subsample of hourly rated and salaried
workers than it is for piece rate workers.
The most robust conclusion that can be drawn from both papers is that
selection eects are very important. In fact, even if there were no true in-
centive eects, the evidence presented in Lazear's paper shows that the over-
all productivity of the workforce that stayed with Safelite was substantially
higher than the productivity of Safelite's workforce before the management
switched to incentive pay. Secondly, Parent shows that, not too surprisingly,
there is a great deal of heterogeneity in worker productivity in incentive jobs.
Indeed, that's partly what a piece rate contract aims to achieve: to allow the
best workers to separate themselves from the least productive ones.
Finally, in perhaps the most interesting study of the three, Ichniowski,
Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) used plant-level data to examine the eects of
many dierent human resource management (HRM) practices, including in-
centive pay, on the productivity of steel nishing lines. Their study is of
particular interest because it provides evidence on the importance of com-
plementarity of HRM practices, a point that was emphasized among other by
Holmström and Milgrom (1994). In other words, successful systems of HRM
practices are likely to occur when they are well designed and implemented
as a group. In particular, they nd that changes in individual work practices
have little eects on productivity.
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See also Athey and Stern (1998) on the topic of complementarity and on how to devise
the appropriate empirical framework in the presence of such complementarities.
20
4.3 Unresolved Issue
Although recent attempts at trying to measure the incentive eect of in-
centive contracts have been able to exploit the longitudinal nature of the
data sets to purge out unobserved components, the assumption that these
eects are xed may not be totally realistic. We can gain some insight about
the proper way to handle the underlying selection process by looking at the
Lazear-Brown model exposited in the section 3.
If we look at Figure 1 or at equation (6) we can see that the sensitiv-
ity of earnings to workers productivity varies with the pay method. In the
extreme case illustrated in Figure 1, people under a salary system are paid
the same, regardless of their individual productivity. On the other hand,
piece rate workers are paid exactly according to their productivity. Thus the
return to skills varies across pay methods, even for the same individual. I
emphasize that part because the recent papers exploiting longitudinal data
sets to dierence out unobserved worker productivity components have failed
to take into account the fact that if the return to productivity varies across
pay methods and if people self-select into dierent pay methods according
to their comparative advantage, then using standard xed-eect methods to
identify the true causal eect from pay method switchers will not eliminate
the selection bias that plagued the cross-sectional studies. In other words,
the xed-eect model answers the what if question by assuming that the
relationship between an individual's skills and her pay is invariant across
pay methods. If the Lazear model is the appropriate way to think about
the choice of pay method, it is clear that this identifying assumption is vio-
lated. Future empirical work should therefore attempt to be more careful in
modeling the selection process.
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Of course, an ideal empirical setup would have random assignment of the workers to
incentive contracts, in which case a simple before-after comparison would provide direct
estimates of the average incentive eect. To the best of this author's knowledge, while such
an experiment was recently carried out in Canada (see Shearer (1999)), no comparable
work has been done in the United States.
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Part II
Incentive Contracts Based on
Group Performance
Outline
In this part, instead of reviewing the existing large literature on the use of
prot sharing plans, I will oer new evidence suggesting (and conrming
previous studies) that prot sharing plans do seem to work, conditional on
certain identifying assumptions. For a very comprehensive overview of the
eect of prot sharing plans, readers are referred to Kruse (1993).
5 Why Provide Incentives Using Group Perfor-
mance and Why Does it Work?
In short, people cannot really provide compelling answers to those two ques-
tions! On the one hand, prot-sharing plans, as an incentive device, suer
from free-rider problem: why would an individual in a group of N workers
really be induced to provide eort when he will get only 1/N of the increased
productivity or prots. Put dierently, why would he not rely on the N-1
other workers' eorts to increase his wage without changing his own behav-
ior. On the other hand, explanations based on the possible benecial eects
of prot sharing plans on team morale, worker cooperation, better internal-
ization of the rm's objectives by the workers, etc., suer from the problem
that they are very dicult to verify empirically.
Given the a priori major problem of free riding, it would seem that rms
would think of another mechanism to provide incentives. However, as is clear
from Table 1 when looking at data from both the QES and especially the
NLSY, prot sharing plans are very common. One possibility is that rms
use such plans mainly because of tax incentives, not because they really think
that workers' productivity will be positively impacted.
Concerning the productivity eect, basically all studies nd a positive
relationship between the use of prot sharing plans and either measures of
productivity or workers' wages. Of course, one diculty in assessing a causal
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eect is that it could well be that while high prot rms tend to have prot
sharing plans, they may still earn high prots without them. In other word,
more convincing evidence would show positive eects following a given rm's
adoption of a prot sharing plan. Such evidence is oered in Kruse (1993).
Essentially, even controlling for rm's unobserved characteristics, those that
switch to prot sharing plans do seem to exhibit higher productivity. How-
ever, Kruse notes that rms adopting prot sharing plans tended to have
rising productivity before the adoption of the plan. In principle, this can
be accommodated by simply adding an interaction term between the prot
sharing dummy and a trend term. This control is intended to capture any dif-
ferential trend in the growth rate of productivity between prot sharing rms
and other rms. As it turns out, when Kruse (1992) controls for dierential
trends on productivity, results are basically left unchanged.
5.1 The Wage Eects of Prot Sharing Plans.
Given that the NLSY data does not contain rm-level data, such as produc-
tivity per worker, I will use instead wage data in addition to a question asked
to workers about the use of prot sharing plans.
21
I then exploit the lon-
gitudinal dimension of the NLSY, including the fact that we know whether
a worker stays in the same job or changes employer, to estimate xed-eect
models of the wage impact of such plans.
In levels, the model I estimate is :
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where w
ijt
is the log hourly wage of individual i in job j at time t, X
it
is
a vector of individual characteristics which may be time-varying, Z
ijt
is the
vector of time-varying job-match attributes (e.g. tenure with the current em-
ployer), and PS
ijt
is a dummy indicator for a prot sharing plan. The other
terms represent unobserved components of variance which may be correlated
with the observable characteristics. As is well known, estimating equation
(8) in levels may produce a biased estimate of Æ if prot sharing plans tend
to be oered to intrinsically more productive individuals (high 's) or to
workers in particularly good matches (high 's). Consequently, one can al-
leviate the unobserved worker quality problem by estimating equation (8)
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It is not possible to know the exact nature of the plan (cash based or deferred based
plan, such as a pension fund in which rms put a percentage of their prots).
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in dierences or by transforming the variables so that they are expressed in
deviations from individual means form. Although unobserved xed worker
attributes are purged out doing this, we may still have a bias stemming from
unobserved job-match characteristics. Consequently, it would be even better
to use dierences within jobs so as to eliminate all time invariant unobserved
components. Exploiting the longitudinal structural within jobs then allows
to measure the eect of adopting a prot sharing plan in a given employment
relationship
Results are presented in table 5. As we can see, although the coecient
does change when one goes from estimating in levels to xed-eect estima-
tion, there is still a statistically (and economically) signicant eect of prot
sharing plans in the case of men.
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In fact, the results for men are very
much in line with what researchers have previously found. Thus, the results
presented here provide further evidence of the benecial eects that prot
sharing plans have on productivity. This assumes, of course, that workers
are paid their marginal productivity. It could be that prot sharing plans
have a wage eect but no productivity eect if rms simply use prot sharing
plans as a simple way to share rents with workers. Although the question
remains as to why they would do that if it has absolutely no eect on worker
productivity.
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The results for women are intriguing in that one possible explanation for
the apparent lack of a relationship between prot sharing plans and produc-
tivity (or at least wages) is that, similar to the argument raised by Goldin
(1986), women with lower levels of labor force attachment would not be inu-
enced in their work eort decision quite the same way that men would in the
presence of prot sharing. If most prot sharing plans consist of contribu-
tions to pension plans (something we do not know from the NLSY data but
which Kruse (1992)'s work strongly suggest is the case), then the perspective
of benetting from contributions that will likely turn out to be much smaller
because of a shorter duration in the employment relationships is potentially
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Moreover, the decrease in the magnitude of the coecient likely results in part from
misclassication of the prot sharing dummy. See Appendix 2 for more details.
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Note also that, given the short time dimension of the NLSY panel, I did not include
lagged dummy indicators for the presence of prot sharing plans in previous years, which
would have reduced the sample size considerably. The idea of including lagged dummy
indicators is that the positive productivity eect of prot sharing plans may take some
time to develop, as the evidence in Kruse (1993) suggests. Thus, the measured eects
shown in Table 5 may actually represent a lower bound of the true eects.
24
less eort-inducive to women.
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5.2 Other Explanations for the Use of Prot Sharing
Is the incentive motive necessarily the only reason why rms would use prot
sharing plans? My reading of the literature on prot sharing is that re-
searchers always emphasize the 1/N problem and view the use of prot shar-
ing plans as a puzzle. In other words, from the start, people take the view
that prot sharing plans are used to provide incentives to groups of workers
and, as such, free riding should discourage its use.
Yet, it is striking that few people, with the exception of FitzRoy and
Kraft (1987) have looked at another, possibly less puzzling motive: rms
may use prot sharing schemes because they provide a simple way for the
rm to commit itself to reward rm-specic skills acquired through on-the-
job formal or informal training programs. Why the need for commitment?
Simply because by their very nature, rm specic skills have no market value,
and thus rms cannot be trusted to share the rents over those skills with
their workers unless one invokes reputation eects. By writing an explicit
contract in which it is specied that workers get a certain percentage of the
prots, workers can feel more condent that they will not be held up ex post.
Consequently, they may choose to devote some time to learning rm-specic
skills.
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One way to assess that conjecture would be to re-estimate the same models, but with
women who are past their childbearing years, either because they have already had the
number of children they planned to have or simply because of age.
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Note that even if the rm pays all training expenses, getting involved in activities that
are of value only to the current rm is costly to the workers: they have to use some of
their time and that time could have been used to enhance their market value. A common
example in academia is participating in committees. This can be time consuming and that
time could have been used to write papers. It is safe to say that the market rewards the
writing of (good) papers but certainly not an impeccable dossier in terms of committee
work.
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Part III
Implicit Incentives, Dynamic
Considerations, and Long Term
Relationships
Outline
We can see from Table 1 that although workers on piece rates or commissions
account for less then 10% of the work force, a signicant fraction of workers
report having received either a bonus or a promotion, or both. This part of
the chapter will look at some of the main theoretical issues involved and at the
somewhat sparse evidence we have available so far. This review of implicit
and life-cycle incentives is by no means comprehensive. I will focus only
on the theoretical notions that yield testable implications. For an excellent
refresher-type survey of the main issues surrounding the provision of life-
cycle incentives, see Carmichael (1989).
6 Eciency Wages
The basic idea of the shirking style eciency wage theory, as described by
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), is that rms facing a moral hazard problem on
the part of the workers will consider either monitoring their choice of actions
(or eort) to ensure that they do what the rms want them to do, or it may
choose to save on monitoring costs by paying wages that are higher than
what is necessary to attract workers. In other words, by giving rents to the
workers and by threatening to re them if they are caught shirking, in which
case the workers will lose all future rents from the employment relationship,
the rm can induce workers to exert eort. In equilibrium, rms all pay
higher than market wages which can only be sustained at the cost of reducing
employment. The endogenous creation of this pool of unemployed workers,
who have to spend some time in that state before being re-employed, acts as
a potent threat and thus workers do respond by working harder.
The only direct implication from this sort of model that has been tested
is the tradeo faced by rms between monitoring and wages. In short, all
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else being equal, rms that monitor more intensively should pay lower wages
because wages act as a substitute for monitoring in motivating workers. That
is, assuming that one controls for the rms' marginal return to eort provision
by workers. If the return to eort varies across rms, then a cross sectional
look at dierent rms may fail to identify the tradeo between monitoring
intensity and wages; in fact it may nd the two to be complements instead of
substitutes, a point raised by Prendergast (1999). In fact, the two attempts
at trying to identify that tradeo have produced mixed results, with Groshen
and Krueger (1990) nding evidence in favor of the prediction and Neal (1993)
not nd much support.
7 Bonuses and Promotions
7.1 Theoretical Issues
Suppose that a perfectly usable measure of output exist but that the rm,
because it wants its workers to devote part of their time to certain aspects of
the job that are not so easily measurable, chooses not to base the worker's
pay only on the objectively quantiable aspect but also on other dimensions
of job performance that inuence rm value. Such components of pay will
therefore be based on a subjective evaluation of performance which will lead
to so-called merit pay or subjectively determined bonuses.
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It would seem that, for a variety of reasons, such arrangements would be
dicult to implement. First, given the subjective nature of the performance
evaluation, it would be very hard for a third-party such as a court to enforce
the terms of such a contract if one of the party felt short changed. The
possibility for cheating on the terms of the implicit contract is real if the
individual who performs the merit evaluation is a residual claimant to the
rm's output. For then there is a clear incentive to under report the worker's
contribution. Anticipating this, the worker is likely not to put forth as high
an eort level as if he knew the evaluation process to be fair. Second, in the
case where the performance is evaluated by somebody who is not a residual
claimant to the output, the evaluator will possibly take actions that may not
be in the rm's interest. These may take the form of either compressing the
distribution of the evaluation ratings around a norm or simply overrating
26
As opposed to bonuses paid to workers who surpassed a certain quantitative target,
such as is often the case in sales work.
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the poor performers because penalizing them is not a pleasant task. Indeed,
the human resources management literature is full of cases reporting such
centrality biases and leniency biases.
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In addition, because performance
evaluations are subjective and thus depend on perceptions, there clearly are
incentives for workers to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to enhance
their chances of getting good evaluations.
As for promotions, they may result from either a subjective performance
evaluation process, or from a tournament-like setup in which a group of
workers are oered a xed set of prizes over which to compete, with the top
performer in the group getting the top prize. The discussion earlier empha-
sized the fact that tournaments allow the rm to lter out the randomness
in output that is common to all the workers in the group. If output is con-
tractible, as was assumed in Part 1, then promotions are based on an explicit
measure of performance. But even when output is too complex to be con-
tracted upon, rms can still set up tournaments in which the top prize goes
to the best performer, as subjectively determined by the rm. As is the case
for merit pay, it is not clear that the rm will not be tempted to deny work-
ers their promotion since, in eect, no one outside the rm can verify either
party's claim as to the quality of the worker's performance.
Before oering arguments as to why bonuses and/or promotions are nev-
ertheless quite common, it should be noted that it is not clear that the bonus
measures calculated using the PSID truly reect subjective performance re-
wards. However, the data show that the incidence of bonuses is much lower
for workers paid on an hourly basis or paid a piece rate than it is for salaried
workers. In fact, in MacLeod and Parent (1999a), we argue that workers paid
commissions or salaries should be treated separately from other workers for
the simple reason that the output of workers on salaries and/or commissions
is likely to contain a much more important random element than the output
of workers on an hourly rate or a piece rate. For example, a salesperson
might work for long hours before closing one deal while another sale could be
made very rapidly. On the other hand, working for a few more hours on an
assembly line will almost certainly lead to higher output. Consequently, the
bonus measure computed from the PSID, while noisy, still seems to contain
some information. In the NLSY, workers are asked directly to report whether
part of the labor income was earned through performance-based bonuses. Al-
though this does not exclude payments for team production, Brown (1990)
27
See Prendergast (1999) for a list of references.
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reports that those are relatively rare. Thus, we can be relatively condent
that the measures of bonuses present in the data sets capture, at least to
some extent, the notion that these reect a subjective evaluation of perfor-
mance. Assuming that this is the case, then it seems clear that their use is
not rare. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 3, the evidence from the PSID even
suggests that it has been increasing over time for salaried workers excluding
sales workers.
Two main lines of arguments are usually oered to account for this. One
invokes the fact that employment relationships are often long term in nature.
Consequently, even when there are short term incentives to, say, underreport
the performance of the worker during a given year, the fear that the worker
will retaliate by not working quite as hard the next year or by simply leaving
the rm can prevent such opportunistic behavior on the part of the man-
ager.
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Examples of papers in the literature that have looked at these issues
of repeated interactions and at how these create the possibility for coopera-
tion between parties with diverging short-term interests are given by e.g. Bull
(1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(1994). I will come back below on what sort of empirical implications can be
tested using these models.
Another line of argumentation has raised the point that rms may penal-
ize themselves by not rewarding superior performance when it occurs. Take
the example of a rm deciding whether or not to promote a worker to a
dierent job in the organization. The implicit agreement here is that the
worker expects to get a promotion under the condition that she performs
well. Assuming that the ecient assignment of that worker (ecient in the
sense that the worker's productivity is higher in the new job) implies that
the worker should be promoted, the rm would actually penalize itself by
not allowing the worker to realize her potential for greater productivity. A
related argument made by Carmichael (1983) is that, assuming rms can
commit themselves to a xed set of prizes (promotions), they would gain
nothing by denying a promotion to a deserving worker since they would have
to give it to somebody else in any case.
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One need not resort to terms like retaliating. In other words, workers need not
consciously penalize their employer by willingly lowering their eort provision. Demoral-
ization or low motivation of the workforce due to perceived broken promises are common
and have much the same eect even if workers think they are working just as hard.
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7.2 Some Evidence
7.2.1 Determinants of Contract Form
By modeling a long term relationship as a repeated game between the rm
and the worker, MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) rst showed that each party
can resist the temptation of not honoring their respective (implicit) promises
only if fullling them creates a surplus with one party earnings at least as
much as in its next best alternative and the other party earnings strictly
more. If that condition is met, they showed that there exists a set of non
trivial self-enforcing contracts in which both parties act honestly. It is called
self-enforcing because the promises of higher eort on the part of the worker
and of rewarding such eort by the rm cannot be legally enforced.
Possible sources of surplus include specic human capital and reputational
concerns on the part of the rm: if workers realize that the rm is cheating
all the time on its promises to reward high eort, then they may retaliate
by withholding eort and thus produce less. Another source of surplus is
involuntary unemployment. Similar to the idea of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
the fear of losing one's job may be sucient to induce workers to provide
eort. But for that to happen, it must be the case that the workers gain
strictly more than in their next best alternative, otherwise nothing would
prevent them from shirking. Consequently, when workers are abundant i.e.
a relatively high unemployment rate, workers get all the surplus from the
relationship. The rms cannot be given the surplus because they can hire
workers very easily and thus it would be very dicult for them to resist the
temptation to renege on the agreement. Conversely, if workers can get jobs
very easily because the labor market is tight, then it would be dicult to give
them the surplus. Firms will motivate workers by paying them a bonus as
part of their compensation package. Workers will trust rms to pay the bonus
because the cost of replacing workers who would quit if not paid the bonus
would be high for the rm. On the other hand, rms could not be trusted
to pay a bonus (after observing a high eort level) when unemployment is
high because the cost of replacing the workers is low. Instead, to motivate
the workers, xed wages set above the workers' next best alternative are paid
and the threat of ring is used to motivate them.
Thus, this model oers the testable empirical implication that there
should be an inverse relationship between the use of bonuses and the unem-
ployment rate. Fairly strong evidence in favor of this prediction is provided
30
is MacLeod and Parent (1999a) and also in MacLeod and Parent (1999b).
In the rst paper, we examine the relationship between bonus incidence and
the unemployment rate dened at the level of the county, while in the second
paper we nd even stronger evidence when we look at the relationship be-
tween the amount paid in bonuses (using the PSID) and the unemployment
rate.
Although these results provide support for the incomplete contracting
model of MacLeod and Malcomson, it is nevertheless possible that the esti-
mated relationship stems from simple rent sharing motives: in good years (i.e.
low unemployment), rms have higher prots and may thus be more willing
to pay bonuses. We would feel more condent about the interpretation we
give to that result if we had some measures of rm prots. While certainly
not a perfect substitute, it turns out that when we include year dummies
fully interacted with industry dummies to reect the time-varying conditions
in a particular industry (including demand conditions), the results are actu-
ally stronger, not weaker. Still, more research in this area (with better data)
seems warranted.
7.2.2 Unions and the Use of Bonuses
As we can see in Figure 3, the use of bonuses appears to be on the rise
since the mid-seventies. Coincidentally, the fraction of workers covered by
a collective bargaining agreement has decreased over the same time period
which would suggest that union coverage wold tend not to be associated with
the use of bonuses. Indeed, that's what we observe not only when we look at
the aggregate data but also when we use a multivariate framework to control
for other factors. It does appear that the declining rate of unionization has
allowed rms to be more exible in its compensation packages. Among the
many tools that rms have to retain workers, one is to oer them wage
increases. But, given the evidence we have on nominal wage rigidity (e.g.
Bewley (1993) or McLaughlin (1999)) rms might very well prefer oering
them bonuses which are by denition temporary instead of oering more
permanent wage increases which cannot be undone so easily.
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7.2.3 Productivity Eects of Implicit Contracts (and of Other
HRM Practices)
In my mind, the most compelling empirical work done on the topic has been
that of Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997). Although it is true they
focus on just one narrowly dened sector, I think the benets of not having
to worry quite as much about unobserved heterogeneity outweigh the costs
of perhaps not being able to readily generalize the results. By considering
clusters of human resource management practices, they emphasize the com-
plementarity between the dierent HRM practices and can they can measure
the individual contribution of each.
One of the HRM practices considered in their paper is the use what they
label as line incentives which reward not only the level of output achieved
by workers on a production line, but also clearly more dicult to explicitly
measure attributes like quality. As such, those line incentive plans have
common features with implicit contracts.
The most important result from the paper is that incentive pay plans do
have productivity eects, but only when used in combination with a host of
other HRM practices such as exible job assignments, training, sharing of
information, etc. When only a subset of those other practices are used, the
productivity eects of incentive pay are muted.
8 Rising Wage Proles as an Incentive Device
8.1 Theory and Evidence
Earlier in Part 1, I briey discussed how rms and/or workers might show
a preference for explicit pay-for-performance contracts such as piece rates
when the employment relationship is not expected to be of a long term nature.
More specically, as argued by Goldin (1986), the low labor force attachment
of women at the turn of the century could have been the key factor behind the
high incidence of piece rate contracts for women relative to men in the same
occupation. For men, who are more likely to stay with the same employer
over a longer period of time, Lazear (1981) suggested that rms might oer
deferred compensation by promising workers that they will be paid more than
their market value in the later portion of their tenure in exchange for being
paid less than the value of their marginal product early on. The idea of tilting
the wage prole is to give workers some incentives to stay with the rm long
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enough so that they will be able to collect the promised rents. The implicit
threat is that they will be red if they are caught shirking and thus will be
denied those rents. Lazear's result of a tilted wage prole is thus consistent
with much of the early evidence on the existence of a positive return to
tenure in addition to the usual return to experience.
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Although wages that
increase with tenure may result from the sharing of rents over rm-specic
human capital, Lazear instead argues that the positive relationship between
tenure and wages may have very little to do with the accumulation of rm-
specic capital. Instead, it results mainly from the provision of life-cycle
incentives.
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Lazear's model was to some extent a response to the evidence reported by
Medo and Abraham (1981) and Medo and Abraham (1980) who showed
with data from two large rms that the employees' wage increases were not
related to the evaluation of their performance. In other words, pay increases
did not seem to be related to productivity in their data. Those results are
very hard to reconcile with human capital theory, but can be rationalized by
appealing to a Lazear type mechanism. Also, Frank and Hutchens (1993)
observe that airline pilots' wages increase with years of seniority, which is
hard to reconcile with the notion that their productivity increases throughout
the employment relationship.
A somewhat direct test of Lazear's model is oered in Lazear and Moore
(1984) where they use self-employed workers as the benchmark. Given that
self-employed workers are not, for obvious reasons, subject to agency prob-
lems, then there is no reason for them to use a Lazear-type mechanism to
elicit eort. Consequently, you would expect their wage prole to be atter
than is the case for employed workers. Lazear and Moore nd support for
that prediction and consequently argue that most of the observed positive re-
lationship between tenure and wages results from the provision of incentives,
not from the accumulation of rm-specic capital.
29
For an early account of a return to tenure, see Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Borjas
(1981).
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In a related vein, Salop and Salop (1996) show that backloaded compensation contracts
may be used to recruit inherently less impatient workers who will accept the lower
starting wage in exchange for a higher wage later on. Those kind of workers are precisely
the ones the rm would like to hire if it cared about developing long term relationships in
which investment in rm specic skills were to be made. Thus, the self-selection of workers
with dierent discount rates would bias upward any measured impact of acquiring skills
on wages. This selection bias has nothing to do with incentive eects though, contrary to
Lazear's model.
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More recent evidence of back loaded compensation comes from the inu-
ential paper by Topel (1991) in which he estimates that workers with ten
years of seniority earn on average about 25% more than other workers with
the same labor market experience who are starting out in a job.
Although these two pieces of evidence would tend to provide support
to the proposition that Lazear-type incentive schemes are commonly used,
there is at least one problem associated with such a conclusion.
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The latest
evidence on the topic of the returns to tenure for employed workers in the
United States suggests that it may actually be quite close to zero (see e.g.
Altonji and Williams (1997), Neal (1995) and Parent (2000)). In fact, Neal
shows that the wage of displaced workers in their post-displacement job is
correlated with pre-displacement tenure, especially for workers who do not
switch industries. This result is hard to reconcile with an incentive-based
explanation for the relationship between tenure and wages as one would not
expect incentive problems within a particular employment relationship to
carry over into the next employment relationship. Consequently, if in fact
wages do not rise with tenure, then this calls into question much of the
literature on the reasons for deferred compensation.
9 Conclusion
In this chapter I reviewed the empirical and theoretical literature on both
the determinants of the way workers are paid and on the eects of explicit
incentive contracts. Although the use of incentives based on an explicit or
contractible measure of performance are not very common, the data showed
that rms use a wide array of other tools such as prot sharing plans and
bonuses to motivate workers.
While the evidence surveyed in this paper points towards fairly large
productivity eects, especially in the case of explicit incentive contracts,
there remains the question of whether the identication strategies employed
so far are completely satisfactory. Of course, the same comment can be
made on just about any sort of empirical investigation. At least in the case
of incentives we have in the Lazear model a useful tool to help us deal with
that problem in that it makes explicit the connection between pay methods,
31
See also Farber (1997) for a discussion about the lack of a tight theoretical connection
between wages and the accumulation of rm-specic human capital which makes dicult
the interpretation of a statistical relationship between the two.
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skills, and the return to those skills. Further explorations of the implications
of that model seem warranted.
Another topic that should be explored more fully is the link between prot
sharing plans and skills. Although, as I mentioned in the text, the usual em-
phasis has been on the incentive eect of prot sharing, it might be at least as
useful to consider prot sharing plans as the solution to a contracting prob-
lem in which rms would like to commit themselves to reward rm-specic
skills but usually cannot, which in turn makes workers underinvest out of the
concern that they will be held up. Additionally, it seems likely that if prot
sharing and skill acquisition are linked, then workers will not only learn truly
rm-specic skills but will also learn general skills in the process. If that is
the case, then one would expect to see the wage/productivity eect of prot
sharing plans to carry over into subsequent employment relationships. This
is, on the surface at least, a readily testable proposition which, if conrmed,
would shed doubts on the incentive motive for the presence of prot sharing
plans.
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10 Appendix 1: The Data Sets
10.1 The Quality of Employment Survey, 1973-1977.
The Quality of Employment Survey, 1973 uses a national probability sample
of persons 16 years old or older who are working for 20 or more hours a
week. Three such separate surveys were conducted: in 1969-1970 (when it was
named the Survey of Working Conditions), in 1973 and in 1977. The panel
version used for some of the results in this paper consists of all those among
the 1455 individuals interviewed in 1972-73 who were re-interviewed in 1977.
All the usual information on wages, hours worked, industry, occupation, etc.,
in addition to individual characteristics, is collected. Of particular interest
for this paper when I analyze the eect of the work environment on the
observed method of pay is a series of self-reported measures on many job
characteristics, such as the level of creativity required by one's job, the degree
to which the respondent's job is repetitive, the level of skills required by the
job, etc. More particularly, I make use of the following questions:
1. MY JOB REQUIRES THAT I DO THE SAME THINGS OVER AND
OVER (variable name: job is repetitive).
2. I GET TO DO ANUMBER OFDIFFERENT THINGS ONMY JOB
(variable name: variety of things to do).
3. I HAVE A LOT OF SAY ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS ON MY JOB
(variable name: worker has a lot of say about what happens on her/his
job).
4. I DETERMINE THE SPEED AT WHICH I WORK (variable name:
worker sets own pace).
5. MY JOB REQUIRES THAT I KEEP LEARNING NEW THINGS
(variable name: job makes worker learn new things).
6. MY SUPERVISOR IS SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING PEOPLE TO
WORK TOGETHER (variable name: teamwork).
Answers are scaled in the following way for the rst ve questions: 1: STRONGLY
DISAGREE; 2: DISAGREE; 4: AGREE; 5: STRONGLY AGREE. I have
re-coded the last two possibilities to 1 and the rst two to zero. The scaling
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of the answers to the question about teamwork is: 1: NOT AT ALL TRUE;
2: A LITTLE TRUE; 3: SOMEWHAT TRUE; 4: VERY TRUE. Again,
this variable is coded as 0 if the answer is 1 or 2 and to 1 if the answer is
3 or 4. Turning now to the method of pay, unfortunately that information
is available only for the 1977 interview. We know whether people are paid
salaries, hourly rates, piece rates, or commissions. We also know whether
their employer is providing them with a prot sharing plan.
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10.2 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1988-1990)
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data set surveyed 12,686 young
males and females who were between the age of 14 and 21 in 1979. In 1988,
1989, and 1990, respondents were asked whether all or part of their earnings
were based on job performance. They were also asked a few questions on
their work environment.
The question pertaining to pay-for-performance is the following:
THE EARNINGS ON SOME JOBS ARE BASED ALL OR IN PART
ON HOWA PERSON PERFORMS THE JOB (HAND CARD D). ON THIS
CARD ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF EARNINGS THAT ARE BASED ON
JOB PERFORMANCE. PLEASE TELL ME IF ANY OF THE EARNINGS
ON YOUR JOB (ARE/WERE) BASED ON ANY OF THESE TYPES OF
COMPENSATION. PLEASE DO NOT INCLUDE PROFIT SHARING OR
EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS.
1. PIECE RATES.
2. COMMISSIONS.
3. BONUSES (BASED ON JOB PERFORMANCE).
4. STOCK OPTIONS.
5. TIPS.
6. OTHER.
They were also asked whether they had received a promotion on their
current/most recent job since the last interview. We should note that it is
not possible to tell a priori whether the bonuses refer to amounts paid at
the discretion of the employer when the latter subjectively considers that the
performance of the employee is worthy of a cash reward, or whether they
32
See MacLeod and Parent (1999a) for details on how we used the job characteristics in
the models of pay method determination and how we deal with the likely endogeneity of
the responses to the job characteristics questions.
42
merely represent another form of piece rate. In the latter case, the employee
gets a reward for achieving or surpassing some kind of quantitative target
which can be objectively determined. A separate question was asked on
whether their employer had a prot sharing plan.
Concerning some aspects of the work environment, although no questions
pertaining to the characteristics of the jobs were asked during the 1988-1990
period, such questions were asked in 1979 and 1982. More specically:
WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF OPPORTUNITIES
THIS JOB OFFERS YOU. (FIRST/NEXT) HOWMUCH OPPORTUNITY
DOES THIS JOB GIVE YOU (READ CATEGORY)- AMINIMUM AMOUNT,
NOT TOO MUCH, A MODERATE AMOUNT, QUITE A LOT, OR A
MAXIMUM AMOUNT? [CATEGORIES]
1. TO DO A NUMBER OF THINGS (VARIETY).
2. DEAL WITH PEOPLE.
3. FOR INDEPENDENT THOUGHT OR ACTION (AUTONOMY).
4. FRIENDSHIPS.
5. TO DO A JOB FROM BEGINNING TO END (PROBE IF NEC-
ESSARY: THAT IS, THE CHANCE TO DO THE WHOLE JOB) (COM-
PLETE TASK).
Answers are re-coded to 0 if respondents answer either A MINIMUM
AMOUNT, NOT TOO MUCH, or A MODERATE AMOUNT, while
they are re-coded to 1 if respondents answered either one of the last two
possibilities.
For each one of 20 occupation cells, I compute the average of the answers
in both the 1979 and the 1982 surveys. I then merge these averages to each
corresponding occupation category for the 1988-1990 period. Note that the
local unemployment rate contained in the NLSY (as is the case with the
PSID) is measured at the level of the county.
10.3 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976-1991)
The sample consists of white male heads of households aged 18 to 64 with
positive earnings for the period spanning the years 1976-1991.
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Individuals
in the public sector and who worked less than 500 hours are excluded from the
33
In the PSID, data on hours worked during year t, as well as on total labor earnings,
bonuses/commissions/overtime income, and overtime hours, are asked at the year t+1
interview. Thus we actually use data covering interview years 1976-1992.
43
analysis. We know whether each worker is paid a piece rate, a commission,
an hourly rate or a salary (the structure of the question pertaining to method
of pay is very similar to the one in the QES).
One interesting feature of the PSID for the 1976-91 period is the fact
that one is able to determine whether a worker received a bonus over the last
year. In the PSID questionnaire, workers are asked the amount of money they
received from either working overtime, or from commissions, or from bonuses
paid by the employer. Since we cannot separately identify the amount of
income derived exclusively from commissions and/or overtime work, I have
to remove these workers from the calculations.
10.4 The January 1977 Current Population Survey (Val-
idation Survey)
A sub-sample of the January 1977 Current Population Survey were asked
questions about hours worked, union coverage, earnings, and also about pay
methods in addition to the usual questions on labor force status, schooling,
demographics, industry aliation and occupational status. They were also
asked to provide the address and name of their employers so that the same
set of questions could be asked to them. This represents the only instance in
which such questions about contract form were asked in the CPS.
34
As is the
case with the PSID, the CPS questionnaire allows us to compute the average
amount paid in bonuses. More precisely, employers (and workers) are asked
whether the workers received any extra amount in addition to their regular
pay.
11 Appendix 2: Measurement Problems
As is well known from the classical measurement error model in which all
variables are continuous, there are two main consequences of having error-
ridden measures:
1. If y, a noisy measure of the true variable y

, is the dependent variable
in a multivariate regression model, the precision of the estimated pa-
rameters will be lower and the explanatory power of the model will also
be lower. However, the estimated parameters would not be biased.
34
Mellow and Sider (1983) provide a thorough analysis of that data set.
44
2. If y is the explanatory variable, then its associated parameter would
be biased toward zero, i.e. we would tend to falsely accept the null
hypothesis of a zero eect more often than we should. Again, if y is all
noise, then it follows that its associated coecient would be zero.
In short, the lesson is clear: measurement error makes it more dicult to
nd statistical relationships.
Now the special case of measurement error that is of particular interest
for the literature surveyed in this paper is where the variable to be measured
is dichotomous (0-1). Then the conclusion for the eect of measurement error
the case of a continuous explanatory variable case carries through: misclas-
sication of a variable biases the coecient towards zero. However, contrary
to the model with a continuous variable, if the dependent variable is mis-
classied the parameters associated with the explanatory variables are also
biased.
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Given that this paper tries to estimate the eect of pay methods on wages
and to study the determinants of those pay methods, we are facing a combi-
nation of those problems: misclassication error of the pay methods will tend
to bias the estimated incentive eect toward zero while mismeasurement of
wages will produce larger standard errors.
In addition, in the models that study the determinants of incentive pay
contracts (e.g. Brown (1990)), the estimated eects are likely to be biased
towards zero because 1) the independent variables, whether they are contin-
uous or categorical, are noisy measures, and 2) the dependent 0-1 variable
is sometimes misclassied. In part because of that, it is not surprising that
studies examining the determinants of pay methods often nd that relatively
few variables enter signicantly and that the explanatory power of the model
is very low.
At the risk of overemphasizing the problem, it must be realized that
measurement error, although it's a fact of life in empirical work, should be
appropriately treated as a major worry.
But how much of a worry should it be? After all, if people do tend to
accurately report the type of contract they have, then we need worry only
about mismeasurement of the other variables of interest such as schooling,
wages, etc. It turns out that we can get a fairly good idea of the underlying
problem by exploiting the January 1977 Current Population Survey. Using
35
See Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) for a proof.
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that data set, it is possible to compute a cross-tabulation of employer and
employee responses to the question on how the workers were paid. If em-
ployers and employees' responses were always the same, then the diagonal
elements of Table A1 should be equal to 100% and the o-diagonal elements
should all be equal to zero. On the other hand, if employers and employees'
responses were not the same then the agreement rate would be less then
100%. As it turns out, we can see from Table A1 that while employers and
employees seem pretty much in agreement concerning hourly rates, the same
cannot be said for incentive pay methods. Consequently, simply looking at
Table A1 would suggest that we should not be surprised at the low explana-
tory of any model trying to analyze the determinants of pay-for-performance
contracts.
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Table 1
Mean Sample Statistics
CPS
(January 1977)*
QES
(1973-77)
PSID
(1984-1991)
NLSI
(1988-1990)
Percentage paid
Hourly 58.6 40.9 48.6 45.9
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Salary 37.5 51.1 38.5 54.1
(0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Piece rates 1.1 2.8 0.9 3.6
(0.10) (0.16) (0.09) (0.19)
Commissions 2.9 5.2 7.7 5.7
(0.17) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23)
Bonuses 8.4 – 10.6 14.1
(0.2958) (0.2902) (0.35)
Profit sharing – 0.1761 – 0.3319
Average amount of bonuses ($1979)*
For hourly paid workers 1079.09 – 1203.35 –
(1920.24) (2935.30)
For salaried workers 2313.05 – 4403.86 –
(5237.76) (8921.40)
Sample size 4905 724 10803 8165
* Computed from workers’ responses.
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Table 2A
Pay Method by Occupation
Quality of Employment Survey 1977
Occupation Hourly Salary Piece rate Commission
Prof., tech, except eng. techn. 14.15% 83.02% 0.94% 1.89%
Engineering and science techn. 28.57% 71.43% 0.00% 0.00%
Writers, artists, etc. 0.00% 77.78% 0.00% 22.22%
Managers and admin. except farm 8.33% 81.82% 2.27% 7.58%
Sales workers 27.27% 9.09% 4.55% 59.09%
Clerical and unskilled 1 * 27.08% 64.58% 0.00% 8.33%
Office machine operators 30.77% 69.23% 0.00% 0.00%
Secretaries 17.65% 82.35% 0.00% 0.00%
Clerical and unskilled 2 ** 46.15% 53.85% 0.00% 0.00%
Craftsmen and kindred 1 *** 59.02% 34.43% 4.92% 1.64%
Mechanics and repairmen 80.65% 17.74% 0.00% 1.61%
Operatives exc. precis. machines & text. 74.19% 22.58% 3.23% 0.00%
Precision machine operatives 68.75% 12.50% 18.75% 0.00%
Textile operators 92.31% 5.13% 2.56% 0.00%
Transport equip. operatives 63.33% 16.67% 10.00% 10.00%
Laborers, except farm 85.00% 15.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cleaning service workers 44.44% 44.44% 11.11% 0.00%
Food service workers 80.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Health service workers 55.56% 44.44% 0.00% 0.00%
Personal service workers 23.08% 61.54% 7.69% 7.69%
* From bank tellers to meter readers for utilities (Census 301 to 334)
** From shipping clerks to ticket agents and other misc clerks (Census 374 to 395)
*** From auto access. installers to machinist apprentices (Census 401 to 462)
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Table 2B
Pay Method/Promotions by Occupation
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1988-90
Occupation Hourly Salary Piece Rate Commission Bonus ProfitSharing Promotions
Prof., tech, except eng. techn. 27.94% 72.06% 0.43% 1.99% 15.46% 35.60% 13.76%
Engineering and science techn. 42.37% 57.63% 0.00% 5.09% 9.32% 41.25% 18.64%
Writers, artists, etc. 21.84% 78.16% 2.30% 9.20% 17.24% 30.13% 14.94%
Managers and admin. except farm 19.98% 80.02% 0.68% 9.84% 28.46% 45.26% 18.91%
Sales workers 25.07% 74.94% 0.78% 37.98% 25.58% 39.29% 11.37%
Clerical and unskilled 1* 43.18% 56.83% 1.34% 3.12% 13.21% 44.55% 16.32%
Office machine operators 43.88% 56.12% 0.84% 1.27% 13.50% 52.88% 14.77%
Secretaries 37.20% 62.80% 1.02% 1.37% 11.60% 33.40% 13.99%
Clerical and unskilled 2** 48.76% 51.24% 1.99% 1.74% 10.20% 42.91% 14.93%
Craftsmen and kindred 1*** 60.32% 39.68% 2.67% 1.60% 10.68% 28.12% 17.97%
Mechanics and repairmen 53.16% 46.84% 4.54% 9.56% 9.89% 24.61% 12.16%
Operatives exc. precis. machines & text. 68.93% 31.07% 8.75% 1.79% 10.54% 30.51% 7.32%
Precision machine operatives 60.44% 39.56% 36.81% 1.10% 9.34% 37.31% 10.44%
Textile operators 66.67% 33.33% 9.76% 0.71% 11.43% 41.57% 10.00%
Transport equip. operatives 50.48% 49.52% 3.38% 8.21% 13.53% 32.06% 10.14%
Laborers, except farm 60.71% 39.29% 6.02% 1.88% 10.34% 22.22% 13.16%
Cleaning service workers 54.46% 45.55% 1.49% 0.50% 7.43% 23.35% 9.90%
Food service workers 52.46% 47.55% 0.52% 1.29% 7.49% 13.39% 11.37%
Health service workers 65.99% 34.01% 2.03% 0.51% 8.63% 16.05% 9.65%
Personal service workers 36.81% 63.19% 1.84% 20.25% 9.20% 18.03% 9.82%
* From bank tellers to meter readers for utilities (Census 301 to 334)
** From shipping clerks to ticket agents and other misc clerks (Census 374 to 395)
*** From auto access. installers to machinist apprentices (Census 401 to 462)
50
Table 3A
Average Job Characteristics by Occupation
Quality of Employment Survey
Occupation Repetitiveness Variety ofthings
Worker
has say
Learn new
things Teamwork Set own pace
Prof., tech, except eng. techn. 51.6% 94.8% 92.3% 95.8% 57.8% 75.8%
Engineering and science techn. 58.4% 80.7% 52.9% 94.6% 82.5% 88.4%
Writers, artists, etc. 28.0% 96.1% 96.1% 96.1% 58.4% 58.4%
Managers and admin. except farm 60.5% 97.7% 93.2% 94.5% 41.3% 84.4%
Sales workers 59.3% 79.7% 85.9% 92.0% 42.4% 77.1%
Clerical and unskilled 1* 74.9% 75.5% 65.0% 80.8% 67.1% 86.9%
Office machine operators 83.9% 75.8% 48.7% 86.6% 62.6% 62.6%
Secretaries 64.1% 88.7% 49.3% 78.9% 76.4% 71.6%
Clerical and unskilled 2** 81.1% 82.0% 48.8% 76.5% 69.3% 71.7%
Craftsmen and kindred 1*** 65.5% 83.4% 68.8% 87.7% 69.2% 79.7%
Mechanics and repairmen 63.2% 85.3% 68.1% 84.7% 48.9% 79.1%
Operatives exc. precis. machines & text. 77.4% 52.7% 45.3% 56.0% 66.0% 54.5%
Precision machine operatives 84.1% 53.7% 51.9% 48.3% 56.4% 62.6%
Textile operators 77.5% 52.6% 40.2% 56.4% 56.3% 63.7%
Transport equip. operatives 86.8% 62.0% 48.5% 60.9% 52.8% 81.9%
Laborers, except farm 97.6% 85.4% 46.1% 56.9% 76.4% 90.7%
Cleaning service workers 79.6% 88.1% 76.7% 73.9% 28.7% 78.9%
Food service workers 89.1% 76.4% 52.5% 62.1% 64.9% 76.7%
Health service workers 76.6% 67.7% 41.2% 91.3% 54.6% 54.6%
Personal service workers 68.8% 80.1% 66.5% 83.4% 44.3% 76.7%
* From bank tellers to meter readers for utilities (Census 301 to 334)
**From shipping clerks to ticket agents and other misc clerks (Census 374 to 395)
***From auto access. installers to machinist apprentices (Census 401 to 462)
Cell entries represent the percentage of workers who consider their job as having the various features listed.
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Table 3B
Average Job Characteristics by Occupation
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
Occupation Autonomy Complete task Variety of tasks Friendship Deal with people
Prof., tech, except eng. techn. 57.36% 73.81% 55.41% 56.93% 76.41%
Engineering and science techn. 61.59% 78.81% 56.95% 58.28% 65.56%
Writers, artists, etc. 67.68% 76.77% 54.55% 65.66% 73.74%
Managers and admin. except farm 61.13% 77.48% 64.61% 56.84% 90.08%
Sales workers 42.08% 63.34% 30.67% 55.92% 84.02%
Clerical and unskilled 1* 32.77% 65.88% 30.67% 49.87% 72.79%
Office machine operators 39.75% 62.46% 38.80% 48.90% 59.62%
Secretaries 44.95% 73.70% 51.07% 54.74% 72.48%
Clerical and unskilled 2** 39.13% 67.69% 37.02% 49.47% 63.69%
Craftsmen and kindred 1*** 47.10% 71.65% 47.99% 56.03% 46.65%
Mechanics and repairmen 48.48% 73.19% 48.96% 50.40% 52.49%
Operatives exc. precis. machines & text. 32.64% 57.46% 33.01% 48.29% 44.99%
Precision machine operatives 28.92% 48.59% 26.51% 50.20% 33.33%
Textile operators 31.73% 59.37% 33.21% 47.31% 33.21%
Transport equip. operatives 40.25% 65.50% 33.25% 48.50% 62.25%
Laborers, except farm 33.04% 62.73% 30.89% 48.44% 45.49%
Cleaning service workers 34.93% 64.95% 27.34% 40.07% 33.65%
Food service workers 28.26% 64.37% 22.19% 54.45% 70.57%
Health service workers 37.99% 68.16% 39.94% 62.01% 82.12%
Personal service workers 47.96% 66.19% 33.09% 58.03% 74.10%
* From bank tellers to meter readers for utilities (Census 301 to 334)
**From shipping clerks to ticket agents and other misc clerks (Census 374 to 395)
***From auto access. installers to machinist apprentices (Census 401 to 462)
Cell entries represent the percentage of workers who consider their job as having the various features listed.
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Table 4
Job Characteristics and Piece Rate/Commission Contracts
PAPERS Gender Presence
of union
Variety
of tasks
Worker
autonomy
Capital
intensity
Establish-
ment size Teamwork
Brown (1990)
Data sets: Industry Wage Surveys +
Dictionary of Occupational Titles(DOT)
Pay method: Piece rates vs Time rates ++ 0 -- 0 ++
MacLeod and Parent (1999)
Data sets: NLSY, PSID, QES, CPS
Pay method: Piece rates vs Hourly rates + 0 -- ++ -
Commissions vs Salaries -- 0 -- ++ -
Garen (1998a)
Data sets: CPS + DOT
Pay method: Hourly rates vs Salaries ++
Geddes and Heywood (2000)
Data set: NLSY
Pay method: Piece rates vs Time rates/Salaries ++ 0
Commissions vs Time rates/Salaries -- -
++ (--) denotes strong evidence of positive (negative) association effect while + or – denotes weaker evidence.
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Table 5
Wage Effect of Profit Sharing Plans, NLSY (1988-1990)
Dependent variable: Log of hourly earnings
OLS Within-Worker Within-Job
PART A: Men
Profit sharing indicator 0.0811 0.0396 0.0359
(0.0195) (0.0134) (0.0141)
R-Squared 0.4314 0.8927 0.9434
Sample size: 4582
PART B: Women
Profit sharing indicator 0.0475 0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0125) (0.0149) (0.0173)
R-Squared 0.4291
Sample size: 3555
The R-Squared statistics for the fixed-effect models are only indicative of a better fit: without an
intercept, they cannot be interpreted in the same way as in the case of models with intercepts.
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Table A1
Cross-Tabulation of Employer and Employee Reports of Pay Methods
January 1977 CPS-Percent of Number of Employee Reports
Employer Report (same categories)
Employee Report
Hourly rate 0.9109 0.0753 0.0091 0.0012 0.0036
Salary 0.1297 0.8446 0.0013 0.0175 0.0069
Piece rate 0.2059 0.0000 0.7647 0.0294 0.0000
Commission 0.1238 0.1524 0.0095 0.7048 0.0095
Daily 0.2051 0.2307 0.0000 0.0000 0.5641
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Figure 3. Fraction of Workers Paid Bonuses and Covered by a Union Contract
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